#Pegasus hacking software software

By turning a blind eye to the effects of spyware produced in democratic nations and sold to autocrats, the United States and its allies have undermined the cause of human rights worldwide.

Second, the Pegasus Project illustrates the high cost of doing business with authoritarian leaders. Note: The regime types listed here refer to close autocracy (CA), electoral autocracy (EA), electoral democracy (ED), and liberal democracy (LD). Source: Steven Feldstein, вЂњCommercial Spyware Global Inventory,вЂќ version 2, Mendeley Data, December 22, 2020, DOI: 10.17632/csvhpkt8tm.2. Targeted surveillance against civil society and regime opponentsД®xtensive spyware links most forms of telecommunication tapped and intercepted Hacking Team, Blue Coat, NSO Group/Circles Hacking Team, NSO Group/Pegasus, FinFisherД®xtensive documented abuse of spyware to target political opponents and civil societyД¬atalan politicians targeted by government

#Pegasus hacking software software

Security officials authorized to tap online communications Pegasus software targeting Rwandan dissidents at the behest of the government Hacking Team, NSO Group/Pegasus, FinFisher, Decision Group, NSO Group/CirclesДЄbusive use of spyware to target civil society Malware to track civil society, opposition, groups, and journalists Hacking Team, NSO Group/Pegasus, FinFisher, NSO Group/Circles Numerous high-profile incidents of surveillance and targeted malware attacks

Spyware targeting hundreds of journalists, activists, opposition politicians, government officials, and business executives Hacking Team, Black Cube, NSO Group/PegasusД«lack Cube involvement in a campaign to discredit nongovernmental organizations ahead of HungaryвЂ™s April election more than 300 phone numbers for journalists, lawyers, business executives, and activists found on the Pegasus spying list Relevant companies, such as Cellebrite, FinFisher, Blue Coat, Hacking Team, CyberPoint, е…ѓ Technologies, Verint, and NSO Group, are headquartered in the most democratic countries in the world, including the United States, Italy, France, Germany, and Israel. As IвЂ™ve written in my book, The Rise of Digital Repression, and documented in a publicly available global spyware database, at least sixty-five governments worldwide, from Chile to Vietnam, have acquired commercial spyware surveillance tools (for a few examples, see table 1). When it comes to the private surveillance industry, NSO GroupвЂ™s transactions represent the tip of the iceberg. Yet, Israel and other democratic countries, including the United States, have not only turned a blind eye to spyware use but have also tacitly supported these sales by approving export licenses. The repercussions from supplying powerful surveillance tools to authoritarian governments are high-citizen security has been compromised, activists have been jailed, and journalists have been killed because of this spyware.

What can we make of these developments and what steps should policymakers take in response?ДЇirst, the proliferation of spyware is a widespread problem that democracies have manifestly failed to take seriously. It has become clear that the human rights costs of NSO GroupвЂ™s spyware far outweigh national security considerations. While NSO Group insists that its products are primarily used by law enforcement for legitimate crime-fighting purposes, the information revealed by the newspaperвЂ™s investigation shows that NSO GroupвЂ™s technology frequently targets individuals who have little to do with crime or terrorism. Steven Feldstein is a senior fellow in CarnegieвЂ™s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where he focuses on issues of democracy, technology, human rights, U.S.